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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HEBER \Y. GLENN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
GIBBONS & REED COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND 
BRIEF OF AUTHORITIES 
No. 7952 
The defendant respectfull~- petitions the Court for a 
rehearing and shows : 
STATEMENT 
The Court has not applied the correct rules of law to 
tht> facts of this case. This appears fr01n the following 
quotation frmn the Court':-; decision appearing on page 2: 
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"The fact that the defendant did not foresee 
the likelihood of such an accident is not controlling 
here, for it was warned that there was danger to 
the n1en working under the vertical bank. Negli-
gence may be the proximate cause of dmnage even 
though the actor was not able to foresee the in-
jury in the precise form in which it occurred, nor 
to anticipate the precise damage which would re-
sult from his negligence. ~Iountain States T. & T. 
Co. v. Consolidated Freightways, ______ Utah ------, 
~-±2 P. 2d 563, Furkovich v. Bingham Coal & Lum-
ber Co., 45 Utah 89, 143 P.121, L.R.~-\. 1915B, -l-~(i." 
BRIEF OF AUTHORITIES 
There are no additional authorities, nor have we 
found a single case, until this one, holding a landowner 
liable under conditions present here. \Ve respectfully 
submit that the Court has given emphasis to selected 
excerpts of testimony and then applied inapplicable legal 
principles to them. The damage here was not caused hy 
a break in the vertical bank, nor hy sloughing or sliding 
material. Those are the dangers feared by the witne~~<'~. 
The evidence and the photographs depicting the same 
show that the bank is still standing. 
The thing that caused the damage wa~ the moYP-
ment of the entire mountain. ~o witne~~ testified that 
tht> defendant could or should foresee that any of its 
activities would cause the mountain to moYe. The trial 
court repeatedly called attention to the fad that WP 
were not concerned with sloughing or ~lidin.~ material; 
that the PYidPJH'P, with re~pect thereto, wa:' not <·ontrollin~ 
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because the sloughing and sliding 1naterial did not cause 
the da1nage. The record is replete with statmnents that 
the dangers which were feared by the various witnesses 
were frmn the sloughing and sliding rna terials or from 
the breaking of the face of the cliff. No one contended 
that those dangers were not present. They were not the 
cause of the damage here. 
By its decision the Court has held that the defend-
ant is liable because it did not reasonably "forsee", what 
neither it nor anyone else could foresee- that the entire 
mountain would move. Neither this defendant nor any-
one else anticipated or could anticipate that this moun-
tain would break away and move. The "danger" that the 
Court states that we were warned about, to-wit: the 
sloughing and sliding of materials, and the break in the 
cliff did not cause the "accident" nor did they cause the 
damage. 'Ye could anticipate sloughing and sliding, but 
not a breaking away of the entire mountain. 
Mr. Spence, one of plaintiff's witnesses, stated (R. 
152). "Well gravel is something that sloughs off all the 
ti1ne. It sloughs by the air. You take a gravel pit, re-
gardless of whether it is straight up and down, you go 
back two weeks after and that same pit that is straight up 
and down you will probably see a couple of hundred 
tons laying at the bottom. That has sloughed during that 
time. It sloughs by the air. Gravel and sand when it hits 
the air is always sloughing. It never stops sloughing." 
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Contrast this with the testilnony of :Jir. Hyde as to 
what actually occurred (R. 68). ··But this went, that 
break occurred here and brought the entire mountain 
down for, oh I would say, two hundred and twenty yards 
anyway, back to the east, the whole mountain came down 
there. Not only can1e down there but it covered over this 
canyon". * * * 
* * * (R. 69) "There \vas natural mountain left up 
there but a big part of that mountain just moved like 
that." 
Also contrast the couple of hundred tons that sloughs 
and slides in a gravel pit according to :Mr. Spence, with 
what ~Ir. Hyde said actually moved (R. 69). * * * "I 
think possibly it was half a million 1naybe three quarters 
of a niillion, but half a million anyway. That is just a 
guess." (He was speaking of the yards of earth that 
actually moved.) 
:Jir. Spence also said in answer to a question as to 
expected dangers, whether he would expect these to in-
elude the movement of the whole mountain. "No I don't 
expect that. I would be in a very poor position to say I 
expected the whole mountain to move" (R. 161). 
The cases cited by the Court, Jlountain .'·Nates Tcll'-
phone and Telegraph ComJuzny r. Consolidatl'd Frci,rJhl-
u·ays and Fltrkoz;ich v. BintJlwm Coal and LumlJcr Colll-
pany, have no application here. 'Ve are not here <'OJl-
sidering the damage that occurred, nor thP injury that 
happened. The injury and damage were to the shovel 
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of the plaintiff. The thing that we could not foresee was 
that which caused the injury and damage. We are not 
claiming that we could not foresee the extent or forn1 of 
the damage. If we cannot foresee the event that did cause 
the da1nage, then "·e should not be held to liability. New-
man moved the shovel hack to where he thought it was 
safe and where it would have been safe from sloughing 
or sliding 1naterial or from a break in the face. We never 
attempted to tell him where he should leave the shovel 
at the conclusion of the day's work. On the occasion in 
question obviously he had moved it to a point where he 
and everyone else thought it was perfectly safe. It 
would have been safe if an event had not occurred which 
no one anticipated or could anticipate. Not even Mr. 
Hyde nor any of the plaintiff's witnesses expected any-
thing to occur such as did occur, and to charge us with 
liability for not "foreseeing" this event, is to make us an 
absolute insurer. 
Other expressions of the Court place constructions 
upon the record not supported thereby. 
For instance the Court says on the first page of its 
opinion that ~Ir. Gordon T. Hyde "testified also that a 
commercial powder man came out and inspected the bank 
and refused to perform any blasting work for the de-
fendant." This statement is apparently made to show 
that the defendant'~ operations were so dangerous that 
commercial powder men would not undertake them. 
rl,hat is not the record. l\Ir. Hyde testified with refer-
ence to the::-;e two pmvder men: 
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"'Q. ~\t that time ~Ir. Keith didn't say that they 
said that they were hard rock men and they 
didn't know how to blast or had had no ex-
perience blasting gravel~ 
~\. Not to me, no. He just said that those men 
looked at the bank and went down. They 
wouldn't blast it. 
Q. .He didn't tell you why~ 
~\. No." (R. 91) 
The reason the commercial men didn't blast was be-
cause they had no experience in gravel. However, l\1r. 
Hyde's own employees did do the blasting, and no harm 
came to them from it. 
The Court also says im1nediately following the above 
quotation. "Some attempt was made by the defendant 
company to raise the shovel operation on the face so that 
the digging did not go constantly to the bottom of the pit, 
in accordance with a method known as •terracing' the 
hill, but the material on the higher level was found to 
be unfit for immediate use and would require extra 
handling to suit it to the purpose of the supply." The 
record is that we began to operate on a second level but 
found the material was too fine and did not suit the Fluor 
corporation. They wanted more gravely material (R. 36). 
There is nothing sinister here. No inference even of 
wrongdoing. :Jir. Reed testified without contradiction 
that there are many ways of operating a gravel pit, in-
cluding the u:-:e of a shovel. That is one of the major rea-
sons why the shovel was developed. "rhe purpose for 
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\\·hich you wanted the gnn·el after you got it out deter-
mined your method of operation (R. -!09). No frmn 
:Jir. Hyde we learn that the material secured by ter-
racing ,,·a~ not ~uitable, and frmn :J[r. Reed that our op-
eration \Ya~ one of many recognized suitable operations. 
X ow here does it appear that the reason we operated as 
we did was because the gravel "\Yould require extra han-
dling if secured by a different n1ethod of operation. 
:Jir. ]~eith, who \\·as in charge of the gravel pit for the 
defendant~, did say that if you are going to use the ma-
terial as a fill, as they were here, you use the shovel 
because to use a dozer or a line you would have to handle 
material twice, which is unnecessary, and not usually 
done (R. 365, 366). The terracing or lack of it was not 
shown to have been the cause of the disaster. 
~lll of that, however, is beside the point in this case 
because the only reason that anyone, including l\Ir. Hyde, 
ever advocated one method over another was to prevent 
sliding frmn the face of the operation. It was not slides 
from the face of the operation that caused the damage. 
It was the breaking away of the 1nountain, and even l\Ir. 
Hyde at several places indicated that no one anticipated 
or could foresee what occurred here. At page 68 he said 
a rter testifying that the entire 1nountain moved: 
"Q. I say, did you expect it to happen~ 
~\. Not to that extent, no." 
Even the decision here states the difference without 
giving it its proper significance. This Court says: "Ap-
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parently, a slide of this proportion was not anticipated 
even by .L\Ir. Hyde or the other men who warned of the 
possible dangers of the operation, although they did rec-
ognize the possibility of dangerous sloughing off of loose 
gravel from the face of the pit." By calling the event a 
"slide" the Court erroneously puts it in the category of 
things \Ye should foresee and against which we were 
warned, whereas actually the event was not a slide at all 
such as testified to by the witnesses, nor was it anything 
like the dangers feared by :Mr. Hyde or any other witne~~ 
and again~t which we were warned. It was something 
no one could foresee and ·concerning which no one warned 
us. 
On page 2 the Court says that we contend that we 
should not be held liable because we could not foresee 
the harm or the manner in which it occurred. This state-
nlent points up the error of the decision herein. \Y e are 
not contending and never have intended to contend that 
we are not liable because we could not foresee the harm 
or the manner in which it occurred. \Ve have already 
attempted to point out that what we are contrnding fori:', 
that we could not foresee the event that caused the harm. 
\Vhat we could not foresee was that the mountain would 
break away and no one even attempted to argue that "·p 
or anyone else could foresee the actual event or the artual 
cause of the damage. 
Thi:-; Court also say~ in the same connection on tlw 
second pa,!.!Y of the decision, that we contend we are not 
liable lwcau~e :-;w·h a slide had not occurred within the 
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history of the Gibbons & Reed operations in this area. 
Our contention is rnuch broader than that. We contend 
that no :such slide had occurred within the knowledge 
of any of the witnesses anywhere. The Court states that 
~Ir. Hyde testified that he had seen similar slides, but we 
subruit he made no such staternent. He had seen slough-
ing off and slides fron1 the face, but never had he ever 
seen the entire rnountain rnove, where between one-half 
and three-(1uarters nrillion yards of dirt nwved (R. 69). 
The Court says that nir. Hyde also, testified "It's 
not unusual if you take the bottonr out. It happens nearly 
every time." \Ye respectfully submit the Court's inter-
pretation of this staternent is not born out by the record. 
~[r. Hyde did use the language just quoted, but in the 
following connection . 
.. Q. In all your experience you have never seen 
anything like it, have you~ 
A. Oh yes, yes, I have seen then1. Not quite the 
same, but I have seen it. I have seen it in 
Parley's canyon. 
Q. So that you would expect it~ 
A. Yes. Not exactly like that but I have seen the 
same cause produce the same effect. 
Q. To that extent~ 
A. I don't think as large as that, no. 
Q. Anything like that~ 
A. 'V ell, like it yes, on the same lines. No, I 
think not, but it is not unusual to have some-
thing of that kind happen. 
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Q. It is not unusual to have a slide in a gravel 
pit, is it~ 
A. It is not unusual if you take the bottom out, 
it happens nearly everytime. 
* * * 
Q. I say, would you expect it to happen~ 
A. Not to that extent, no." (R. 87-89). 
This testimony is very different from saying that 
what happened here happens nearly every time "you 
take the bottom out." 
:Mr. Hyde had also testified that we had removed a 
wedge which was supposed to have retarded sliding, but 
again he said: "that retarded any slipping unless then' 
was a terrific pressure directed behind it." (R. 4-t 
Italics added). 
Nothing that we did had aroused anxiety or led :\lr. 
Hyde to exercise any care for his own equipment, "·hielt 
he thought wa:-; perfectly safe because it was 100 feet 
away. What he meant by our operation being dangerous, 
was to smneone working under it (R. 81-S:q, and ahnost 
at the conclusion of his testimony, he frankly repeated: 
"Q. Y ?u said there was some danger, you thought 
that there was some danger here although you 
may not have visualized it wa:-; that gTPat. 
that you havp seen this sort of thing <·lt>atlt><l 
out at the bottom, that that wa:-; the usual 
thing for it to slide. 
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In your opinion, could you have an,ticipated 
or seen tlza.t the slide caul d haL'e covered up 
the full pa.rt of the pit'! 
.A. I didn't expect it to." (R. 112, 113. Italics 
added) 
X or did the expert when cross exmnined testify as 
indica ted by the Court on page :2 of the decision. The 
expert, Professor Cook, said that the explosives were not 
the contributing cause of this cataclysm, nor did he know 
what caused it ( R. 225). He also said : 
"Q. In order to consider the clay as an important 
factor in the break, wouldn't you have to 
know how extensive it was~ Where it was, 
something about it~ 
A. Actually you would and I am expressing it 
merely as a theory. I agree. I don't know 
what actually caused this break. I say that 
the evidence that is there I would suspect, as 
a result of the evidence there, that there was 
a clay bed underneath this burden. We see a 
clay bed. Now that is in about the right posi-
tion for it to have caused this particular dif-
ficulty. And I will tell you one other thing 
that you know beyond any question-
Q. Now, wait a minute, before we leave this. 
You don't know where the clay bed is except 
where you saw it in this one spot out there~ 
A. Well you can see in its position with respect 
to the rest of the burden that it was near the 
bottmn of the break. It \vas near the bottom 
of the 111a terial. 
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Q. I say you don't know how extensive it is, 
Dr. Cook? 
A. That's correct. You can't see into the face. 
Q. So you can't tell without knowing the extent 
of the clay bed whether it was a factor or not·? 
A. That's right. You need to know all of those 
details. 
Q. That's right, you need to lmow that. And you 
don't know that? 
A. That's right, I only suspect that that was 
the situation." (R. 223) 
With reference to explosives, he said: (R. 225) 
"A. No indeed, I don't believe that the explosives 
had anything to do with the break practically, 
only a slight mnount. It doesn't have a direct, 
it wasn't the direct cause of the breah:.'' 
'Vith reference to the plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence this Court says the "Plaintiff had no knowledge of 
the probable presence of water and wet clay at the base 
of the graY<>l" etc. Koone else had any knowledge of tlw 
"probable presence of water and wet clay at the ba::w of 
the gravel'' a.t the time of this disastr>r. ::\lr. I~eith 1:-; 
undisputed in his answer to the following question: 
"Q. All right, take your seat up there again, 
please, l\lr. Keith. So that you encountered 
the water earlier and a:-; you proreded back 
with your work it disappeared? 
~\. Right." (R. 362) 
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~Ir. Glen had all the information that we had. He 
1~ an experienced contractor, and everything that \Yas 
obvious to us was even nwre obvious to hin1. He was 
fearful, he says. \Ye were not. But he did nothing to pro-
tect his property. X o different inferences can be drawn 
fr01n that. Either the fear was ignored, or he thought 
the danger was not pressing. In either case, we are not 
more responsible than he is. Everything was open and 
apparent, there was nothing concealed. If we are liable, 
he is liable. He expressed concern where we felt none. 
He didn't even take the trouble to go back to see if 
X e\nnan had renwved the shovel fr01n the, to hin1, ob-
vious danger of the high bank. And he didn't move it 
himself because he didn't want to dirty his suit. 
CONCLUSION 
\Ye respectfully submit that there is nothing what-
ever in this record to justify a reversal of the trial court. 
\Ye were using our own land for lawful purposes in a 
lawful and recognized manner. Neither we nor anyone 
else had any reason to expect, nor could we possibly 
foresee the thing that happened. The trial court should 
he affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SHIRLEY P. JONES 
SHIRLEY P. JONES, JR. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
GIBBONS & REED 
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